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Introduction
On 18 September 2014, the electorate of Scotland voted in a referendum to reject Scottish independence by a 55%-45% margin. Whilst not precluding a similar referendum being held at some future date, the continued status of Scotland as a constituent part of the United Kingdom albeit one endowed with substantial devolved powers 1was settled in the short to medium term. The pro-Union UK wide political parties had all pledged support during the campaign for the expansion of " otla d s auto o i the e e t of a o ote a d, 2 notwithstanding continued debates over the exact scope of the enhanced powers to be devolved to the Scottish 1 These are devolved to the Scottish Parliament by the Scotland Acts of 1998 and 2012. 2 See Armstrong & Bowers (2015) . addressing it. It begins by providing some background upon the constitutional development of the United Kingdom through the introduction of devolution for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to the present day. It then briefly outlines the nature of the controversy caused by the E glish uestio , efo e o sidering the recent move to introduce E glish o l otes in the Westminster Parliament. In light of the dangers posed by this initiative, alternative mechanisms of an English Parliament and the introduction of regional government throughout England are touched upon. The latte optio is a gua l the p efe ed optio fo add essi g the E glish uestio , ut the la k of e thusias fo su h a o e ea that ad ho a d pie e eal effo ts to strengthen local power are perhaps the best that can be hoped for in the foreseeable future.
Background: The United Kingdom from Inception until the Present Day
In historic terms, the present day United Kingdom is a relatively recent creation. While England and Wales had been administered jointly since the mid-sixteenth century, union between England and Scotland did not occur until the 1707 Act of Union. 6 Unlike Wales, however, Scotland has throughout its membership of the union retained and operated its own legal, educational, and religious systems. 7 The 1800 Acts of Union united the three constituent parts of Great Britain with Ireland in the United Kingdom. Most of Ireland achieved independence in 1922, although the six counties in the North where majority support existed for the union remained part of the UK as Northern Ireland. With the exception of the Northern Irish Parliament, which operated from 1921 until its suspension in 1972, the UK has functioned essentially as a unitary state until relatively recently, with all executive and legislative powers invested in the UK government and Westminster Parliament.
Pressure for devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and (following the restoration of direct rule) Northern Ireland, built up from the 1960s onwards and enjoyed the broad support of the Labour and Liberal/Liberal Democrat parties. The attempts of the Callaghan government to establish Scottish and Welsh devolved institutions in the late 1970s failed when the population of Wales rejected such a move in a referendum, and a Scottish referendum on the establishment of an Assembly with legislative powers failednotwithstanding a majority vote in favourdue to a statutory requirement that 40% of the Scottish electorate support the initiative. 8 Following the election of the Labour government in 1997, fresh referendums were held on the establishment of devolved institutions for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Following positive votes, 9 these came into existence in 1999, the Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly enjoying primary legislative powers. In subsequent developments, the Welsh Assembly was also conferred with some primary legislative powers. 10 While the constitutional status of Wales and Northern Ireland was largely settled, the a paig fo " ottish i depe de e has su ged si e " otla d s a uisition of devolution. Support for Scottish independence can arguably be attributed in large part to political nationalism: the pe eptio that " otla d s politi al i te ests do ot o e ge ith those of the United Kingdom as a whole, and only through its independence can these be adequately protected. In general terms, Scottish politics have tended to take place within a discourse that 8 See Bochel, Denver & Macartney (1981) . 9 On the Scottish referendum, see Michell, Denver, Pattie & Bochel (1998) . 10 On the systems of devolution in place, see Hadfield (2011: 216-232). is to the left of those of the wider UK. The outcomes of successive general elections reinforce this. Until the 2015 general election, the Labour Party had taken the overwhelming share of Scottish parliamentary seats for several decades, 11 and in an astonishing surge in electoral popularity the SNP won all but three seats in Scotland in 2015. 12 However, as from 2010 onwards, Scotland has often found itself governed at UK level by a Conservative or Conservative led government lacking in much support in that country. 13 This at times has resulted in the charge that Scotland finds itself subjected to policies its electorate have not supported, delivered by governments lacking a popular mandate in Scotland. The tone of the Yes a paig i the e e t i depe de e efe e du a paig eite ated su h ha ges. 14 The independence cause gained a boost with the ascent to power at Holyrood of the Scottish National Party following the 2007 Scottish Parliament electionsre-elected with a clear majority in 2011and polling data has shown a gradual rise in support for independence. 15 The 2014 Independence Referendum was held following negotiations between the Scottish executive and the UK government, taking place with the consent of the UK government, which had committed itself to honour the outcome of the process. 16 Although 11 In the 2005 & 2010 general elections, Labour won 41/59 Scottish parliamentary seats. In the previous general elections it took respectively 56/ 72 (2001 & 1997) and 49/72 (1992) . 12 The La ou , Co se ati e a d Li e al De o at pa ties ea h took o e seat to the "NP s fift -six. 13 In the post-WWII era the Conservative Party has not taken the largest number of seats in Scotland since 1955. In recent decades, its support in Scotland has plummeted. It won no seats there in the 1997 general election and has only taken one seat in the successive four general elections. 14 See, eg., the Scottish Govern e t s hite pape , Scotland s Future (2013). The importance for independence in e su i g that " otla d s politi al i te ests a e p ote ted is e phasised th oughout. A o g the ke a gu e ts ad a ed a e that De isio s a out " otla d ill e take …those ho li e a d o k he e p. ii a d Go e e ts ill al a s e fo ed pa ties that i ele tio s i " otla d. It ill o lo ge e possi le fo ke de isio s to e ade go e e ts that do ot o a d the suppo t of the " ottish ele to ate p. ii . See further pp.40-47. 15 Lynch (2005: 510-513). some polling data published in the later stages of the referendum campaign suggested there may be a narrow majority in favour of independence, 17 i the e e t " otla d s ele to ate rejected this by a 55%-45% margin. 18 A gua l a ke fa to i deli e i g the No ote as the pledge of all of the p o-union parties to enhance the autonomy of the devolved Scottish institutions. This, however, has only contributed to a strengthened feeling in the other constituent parts of the UK that they are somehow disadvantaged within the current UK constitutional arrangement. Although a body of opinion in both Wales and Northern Ireland favours enhanced powers for their own devolved institutions, 19 ou p ese t fo us is upo the E glish Questio . bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-29096458 18 However, the pressures for independence do not appear to have gone away. Although support for the SNP cannot be assumed to equate with support for independence, its unprecedented 50% share of the vote in Scotland in the 2015 general election arguably reinforces this. Furthermore, the SNP have declined to rule out another i depe de e efe e du i the ea futu e. "ee, eg., Ni ola "tu geo efuses to ule out f esh " ottish i depe de e efe e du du i g the e t pa lia e t , The I depe de t, Ap il , available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/general-election-2015-nicola-sturgeon-refusesto-rule-out-fresh-scottish-independence-referendum-during-the-next-parliament-10188089.html 19 "ee, eg., Offe Wales sa e po e s as " otla d, sa s Ca Jo es , BBC Ne s O li e, No e e , available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-30226324 an important, and probably often decisive, effect on English politics while they themselves have no say in the matters in " otla d, Wales a d No the I ela d. 20 Although hypothetical at the ti e i light of the failu e to de ol e po e s to the UK s o stitue t pa ts, the issue e a e pertinent two decades later following the creation of the devolved institutions in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast.
The English Question
The position brought about by devolution, whereby many matters affecting Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are determined in their devolved bodies without any English involvement while at the same time those matters affecting just England are decided upon by a UK-wide Parliament in which non-English MPs retain the power to cast a vote, has been the source of considerable grievance for English politicians and voters alike. 21 The resulting situation might be criticised on the related grounds of fairness and democracy. It may be regarded as inequitable that those representing some parts of the UK are able to influence matters affecting another part of the UK when the representatives of that part may not similarly influence matters in the other parts of the UK, there being a lack of reciprocity. Similarly, it can be regarded as undemocratic that a matter which affects only England can actually be decided against the will of a majority of its representatives when the votes of Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish MPs determine the outcome of a Parliamentary vote.
Although the " ottish Natio al Pa t s MPs ha e historically adopted a practice of abstaining from voting on English affairs given their absence of any It would merely involve the adoption of modified procedures for existing legislative processes.
Herein, perhaps, is the cause of another advantage, namely the apparent popularity of this initiative among the electorate within England. 27 Arguably, the increased powers to be devolved to Scotland have only strengthened English feeling that the legislative affairs of the Westminster Parliament which only affect England should be entrusted specifically to English
MPs. The Conservative party has made the case fo E glish o l otes, although this suppo t 26 We use the te E glish o l otes i the p ese t pape fo sake of o e ie e. Ho e e , it is also used to refer to all situations in which Parliament considers legislative proposals that are only to apply to some parts of the UK, be this England, England and Wales, or England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In such cases, references to E glish o l otes e te d to otes take all MPs ep ese ti g o stitue ies i the pa ts of the UK to hi h the resulting legislation will apply. 27 See McKay Commission (2013: 16) for polling data which showed that 81% of English voters agreed that Scottish MPs should not vote on bills only affecting England. See also commentary provided by YouGov in October 2014, E gla d s a k a d a s e to the West Lothia Questio , a aila le at https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/10/20/englands-awkward-answer-west-lothian-question/ must be understood in the context of the potential advantages which such a move could have fo it politi all , gi e the Co se ati es ele to al st e gth lies i E gla d, it ei g poo l represented in Scotland, 28 a d to a lesse e te t, Wales. The e its of E glish o l otes, however, can only be evaluated once we understand how such procedures will be implemented and their constitutional implications.
Models for English only votes
There are a number of va ia ts upo a odel fo E glish o l otes, hi h a ge i te s of their impact upon established legislative procedures from merely strengthening the extent to which English MPs are specifically consulted upon legislative proposals that will only apply to (2000). 33 Cabinet Office (2014:25). 34 Democracy Task Force (2008). 35 Cabinet Office (2014: 25-26). subsequently expressed to be the favoured option of the Conservative party, 38 and eventually introduced via amendments to standing orders. Although theoretically the full House retains the final word on the adoption of English bills, in reality this option merely retains constitutional formalities while introducing a distinction between different kinds of legislation based upon the intended geographical scope of its application. However, while English MPs will ultimately determine if a bill can succeed, oddly their wishes could be overridden where the full House chooses not to pass a bill at its third reading.
Constitutional implications
Notwithstanding the logic underpinning arguments for English only votes and apparent popular support for such a move, 39 significant constitutional implications arise from taking such a step a d i the ie of this autho it should e eje ted as a solutio to the E glish uestio .
Although the extent to which English only votes give rise to constitutional concern is dependent upon the nature of the model adopted, six points might be noted as cause for further parts, especially Scotland, if the populations of these areas come to feel that their representation and participation within UK wide structures has become diluted. The narrow defeat for Scottish independence in 20 s efe e du a d the su se ue t su ge i "NP support leading to its phenomenal success in the 2015 general election should be cause for concern in this respect. 40 Leyland (2005: 444) .
A more practical constitutional problem potentially arises from the political demographics of England vis-à-vis the UK as a whole. Unlike the other constituent parts of the UK, England does not have its own government. The UK government, ordinarily formed by the party or parties able to obtain a majority in the Westminster Parliament, is essentially also the government for England. It is a fundamental constitutional principle that a government must be able to command the confidence of the House of Commons. 41 However, situations can conceivably arise in which a UK government is formed by a party (or coalition of parties) which does not hold a majority of English constituencies. This is unlikely ever to be a problem for a Conservative led government, which draws its overwhelming strength from England, but could prove to arise in respect of a Labour government with a small UK wide majority in Parliament that is dependent upon Scottish and Welsh MPs. 42 The outcome may be that such a government would struggle to implement its legislative agenda within England, undermining its very position as the sitting government. This would be most bizarre, it ei g a a epted featu e of the West i ste s ste that a go e e t ust get its legislatio . 43 Hazell (2001: 278) . 44 Bogdanor (2014). of the government, which is then compelled to fund them. 45 This is a recipe for constitutional chaos. It may even mean that a UK government, with a UK wide majority in Parliament, has to enter into agreements (or even coalition) with smaller parties in order to effectively legislate for England. If this is not possible, a government with a UK-wide majority may even be compelled to resign, disproportionately empowering a minority UK party which might be able to obtain a simple majority of English seats. The potential instability threatened should be a cause for concern, although one unintended consequence may be increased support for a system of proportional representation, as one of the principal objections to its introductionproducing unstable governmentwould be difficult to sustain if electoral outcomes were already resulting in situations in which UK governments were increasingly forced to rely on alliances and coalitions to govern England. 46 Third, the idea of English only votes may be implementable within the House of Commons, but it must not be forgotten that all bills must pass through both chambers, and it would be difficult to apply this principle to the procedures of the House of Lords. 47 Its unelected members do not represent constituencies, nor are accountable to groups of people resident in any designated areas, but sit as individuals in their own right. This problem may, however, be overstated given the relatively limited power of the House of Lords. As a consequence of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, 48 bills passed by the Commons may only be delayed, not 45 Bogdanor (2009: 103) . 46 Indeed, there is already evidence that the popular vote has entered a stage of fragmentation in which the shares obtained by the major parties, and their ability to obtain parliamentary majorities, has begun to decline. Whereas the combined Labour-Conservative share of the vote was almost 94% in 1945, this had declined to just 65% in 2010. 47 See Leyland (2005:446 votes is only possible because the current government has a UK wide majority, which means that more often than not it should be able to pass its legislative agenda anyway. Ironically, this device would not be able to st ike its ai ta get, a el a Labour government which lacked an English majority, as such a government could simply revise procedures itself to abolish E glish o l otes.
From some perspectives, the focus on English only votes overlooks the inherent consequences of any system of political representation in which the wishes of the representatives of any region can be overridden by the majority vote of the collective whole. Russell & Lodge (2006: 84-88) .
arguably simplistic and not so straightforward in practice. 58 For example, where decisions are taking on so-called E glish atte s hi h i ol e pu li e pe ditu e, the a gu e t has ee ade that these a e ele a t to all pa ts of the UK as the ill di e tl affe t the size of the lo k fu d goi g to a de ol ed od . 59 The recent changes provide that the speaker of the House of Co o s ill e tif he a legislati e p oposal is a E glish o l atte , 60 but given some of the contentious issues alluded to, this threatens to draw the traditionally neutral and independent speaker into matters inherently political in nature.
Addressing the English Question through New Institutions

An English Parliament
Whe eas the E glish o l otes optio ight e ega ded as a ui k-fi o k eeje k ea tio to pressures for greater fairness for England within the UK constitutional framework, more substantive and principled constitutional change could arguably be achieved through two main mechanisms. One of these, considered below, is the introduction of a number of regional assemblies throughout England conferred with devolved powers along similar lines to that currently enjoyed by the institutions established in the other constituent parts of the UK. The other mechanism is the creation of an English Parliament to function separately from the Westminster Parliament effectively as a devolved legislative body for England akin to the manner in which the Scottish Parliament serves such a function for Scotland. This would mark 58 See, eg., Bogdanor (2014) . 59 Bogdanor (2009: 104) . 60 Standing Order 83J (1).
the creation of a federal UK constitutional structure. As fa the la gest of the UK s constituent parts, the legislative powers conferred upon an English Parliament would be expected to be substantial and more in line with those enjoyed by the Scottish Parliament than the more limited powers of the Welsh Assembly.
The creation of a federal UK constitutional structure within which legislative bodies exist for all four constituent parts of the union has some logic to it. Theoretically, it addresses the very problem posed by the English question while avoiding the creation of a two tier system. It could provide an English governmental mechanism that is both transparent and democratic. 61
Equality is guaranteed between the four parts of the Union. Matters directly affecting each country individually would be largely handled at that level, while there would remain a UK wide government and Parliament responsible for matters pertaining to the UK as a whole. Such federal structures abound, with the US, Canada, and Australia some of the more prominent examples of states in which power is shared between a federal government and a series of states or provinces. Obstacles to the creation of an English Parliament arise however, from both a lack of popular support and practical dangers. 62
There is little public support for such a step among the English electorate, 63 which is perhaps best understood within the context of a general disinclination to create further layers of government. As 'ussell a d Lodge ote, While the otio of E glish otes o E glish la s appears to be winning popular support there is no sign yet that the English have an appetite for 61 Russell & Lodge (2006: 88-9) . 62 See Leyland (2005: 445 to tailo the to se e E gla d s i te ests ette i e tai defi ed i u sta es ie., E glish only votes for English matters).
Although popular opinion is not fixed, meaning that current opposition should not be used as sufficient reason to discourage proposals for an English Parliament that are based on sound principle, practical objections to its creation have also been advanced. Given the large proportion of the UK population which England accounts for, 66 while the creation of an English
Parliament may address some current English grievances, it is suggested that this would not help perceptions of the other regions within the UK that it is dominated by England. Indeed, English dominance at Westminster was a key factor in the growth of support for Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish devolution. The legislati e po e s e jo ed the UK s o stitue t pa ts ould e u likel to e ide ti al, just as " otla d s po e s u e tl e eed those o fe ed upon Wales, and to a lesser extent, Northern Ireland. English grievances may be replaced by an agg ie ed Welsh ele to ate, hi h pe haps fi ds itself as the poo elatio i a e constitutional arrangement. 64 Russell & Lodge (2006: 89) . 65 Cited in McKay Commission (2013: 18). A similarly low level of support was identified by the Future of England Survey conducted by Jeffery et al (2014: 18-19 Wales and Northern Ireland. 68 It has, however, been noted that there is no precedent for a successful federal structure in which one part accounts for five-sixths of the total population, as
England does within the UK. 69 For example, by sake of comparison, the largest states within the US, Australia and Canada only account for 12%, 70 32% 71 and 38.5% 72 of their overall populations respectively and in national terms amount to a minority within the collective whole.
Regional Devolution within England
The introduction of a coherent system of regional devolution within England might be regarded as a more appropriate and less constitutionally problematic means of addressing the English question than the full-blown federalism that would be shepherded in through the creation of an English Parliament. It is similar in that it envisages the transfer of power from the Westminster Parliament to further English interests, but instead of identifying these in olle ti e E glish te s, it e og ises these as est ep ese ted o a egio -by-region basis throughout England, with a series of assemblies established to exercise decision-making powers in respect of each English region. One attraction of such a model lies in that it may be more appropriate for taking account of the size and diversity of England, representing as it does such an overwhelming share of the overall UK population. Using the nine administrative regions of England used for electing members of the European Parliament, 73 the resulting regional institutions would represent populations more akin in size to that of Scotland. 74 The devolved institutions created could potentially result in a constitutional structure for the UK that bore some resemblance to those of successful federations, such as those already mentioned.
In practical terms, the regional option appears less controversial or constitutionally problematic than does the creation of an English Parliament. In some respects, it arguably represents a natural next step in a process already begun in which various regional fora exist to 73 represent regional interests, 75 stemming at least as far back as the creation of the Regional Development Agencies by the Blair government in 1999. 76 The establishment the following year of the Greater London Authority and an elected mayor for London might also be regarded as a step in the direction of devolving power to the English regions. 77 A strong case for regional government throughout England can also be made in support of the principle of subsidiarity. 78
The problem, however, lies again in the apparent lack of any enthusiasm among the English population for regional government. 79 Following a white paper produced by the Blair government, 80 which gave eight English regions the option of establish a regional assembly, 81 in June 2003 proposals were announced for referenda to be held in the North-East, North-West,
and Yorkshire and the Humber on the question of the creation of such assemblies in those areas. 82 Following an overwhelming rejection of the proposals by the electorate in the North-East, 83 the other proposed referenda were abandoned. 84 75 See Leyland (2005: 447-453) . 76 See Lodge & Mitchell (2006: 106-117) . 77 For the background to this development, see Bogdanor (2009: 197-213) . 78 Originating as a principle of European Union law, subsidiarity holds that decision-making functions should be exercised at the most appropriate level in accordance with economy and efficiency. See Barnett (2011: 148-149) . 79 See McKay Commission (2013: 18) . A 2012 poll only uncovered support from 8% of the English electorate for the creation of regional assemblies. See also the Future of England Survey (2014), which put support at 9%. A 2003 poll, however, did put support higher at 24%. See Curtice (2006: 121) . Furthermore, there is no significant regional variation apparent in support for regional assemblies (p.123), although a 2003 poll placed support in the North-East 12% higher than in the Eastern and South-East regions (33% vs 21%). 80 See Department for Transport, Local Government & the Regions (2002) . For discussion, see Leyland (2005: 453-456 Apart from a possible lack of appetite for a new tier of government or general satisfaction with existing constitutional arrangements as far as England is concerned, two observations might be made in respect of the absence of support for regional bodies. One difficulty arises in constructing regions with a sufficient degree of shared identity to underpin support for regional decision-making mechanisms. The nine administrative regions are artificial constructs encompassing diverse areas whose populations may not naturally identity with one another, nor the large regions within which they are placed. For example, the North-West region encompasses the relatively urban Greater Manchester and Merseyside as well as the more rural Cheshire and Cumbria. Many people are more likely to identify with a county, such as Yorkshire or Lancashire, although the viability of tiers of government located at the country level is questionable given their relatively small-size. Even then, such regional identities will often be weak in comparison to the national identities of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 85 Secondly, a key factor in generating support for their creation may be the conferment of significant executive and legislative powers upon regional bodies. It is notable that the powers proposed for the assemblies for the North-East, North-West, and Yorkshire and the Humber were very limited in contrast to those enjoyed by the devolved bodies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, 86 and would have only been conferred with budgets comprising 3-4% of total regional spending, 87 which may explain their lack of support. Notwithstanding some of the difficulties which would need to be addressed before proceeding down this route, a sound practical and democratic case can be made for the 85 Furthermore, even within country regions there will be limits to shared identities, for example urban and rural areas perceiving their core interests in different terms. 86 Department for Transport, Local Government & the Regions (2002: ch.4 ). 87 Department for Transport, Local Government & the Regions (2002: ch.5 ). See also Sandford (2006: 185-187). creation of a tier of devolved regional government within England. It is not a pre-requisite for the establishment of regional institutions that the local populations consent to their creation.
Arguably, however, some form of democratic legitimacy is desirable. Any attempt to create regional fora is therefore likely to require considerable effort by way of public information campaigns and similar initiatives.
Localism: A Piecemeal solution
An important development for the devolution of power within England during recent years has ee the p o otio of the lo alis age da, hi h oadl speaking has seen attempts to enhance decision-making powers exercised upon a local level. The Blair government gave local authorities the option to establish executive style government under the leadership of a directly elected mayor. 88 Building upon this, the Localism Act 2011 introduced by the Coalition government sought to strengthen local power further by establishing a general power of competence for local authorities, 89 giving rise to the assumption that they are empowered to do anything not specifically prohibited. The Act also provided for referendums to be held in E gla d s la ge ities o the optio of ha i g a ele ted a o , 90 and empowered ministers to transfer powers from central government to local authorities. 91 The merits of the aforementioned developments are beyond the scope of the present discussion, although they do indicate a growing perception that the dispersal of power on a local or regional level is desirable. Potentially such steps may eventually lead to more substantive devolution within England along the lines of the kind of regional government which we have already expressed a preference for as a means of addressing the English question.
However, the current localism agenda is insufficient for this purpose. It represents a piecemeal approach in which different decision-making structures will exist in different areas, entrusted with varying degrees of decision-making authority. The localism agenda to date has been marked by ad hoc developments devoid of any coherent of consistent vision for the enhancement of local or regional decision-making within England. Nor does it entail the devolution of primary legislative powers along the lines in which these have been conferred upon the existing devolved institutions in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. Although to some extent a degree of diversity may be justified by reference to the varying needs and desires of 92 "ee, eg., Ni e ities eje t ele ted a o s , BBC Ne s, Ma , a aila le at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukpolitics-17949950 93 See Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill 2015. 94 "ee G eate Ma heste to o t ol £ NH" udget , Fe ua , a aila le at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-31615218 different localities, to address the English question satisfactorily requires a regional tier of government far more robust, coherent, and uniform than what currently exists or is proposed.
Conclusions
Essentially, the English question has two key parts to it. The first concerns voting processes within the Westminster Parliament which stem directly from the West Lothian question. The second is about enhancing decision-making powers within England through other fora. In many respects, the problem is exacerbated because the UK structure essentially suits England, 95 the population of which desires no radical constitutional restructuring, but is sufficiently aggrieved at the impact of devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland to demand some form of redress which takes account of the English question. The natural conclusion of such pressures is a elati el ui k-fi solutio i esponse to the first part of the question: English only votes, as successfully implemented by the Conservative party. While English only votes within the Westminster Parliament appear to enjoy considerable popular support, as we have already established, this mechanism gives rise to various constitutional problems. Against this context it is diffi ult to disag ee ith the o lusio of Ve o Bogda o that, fo the ti e ei g, therefore, the West Lothian [aspect of the English] question will have to remain u a s e ed. 96 This does not mean, however, that the English question cannot be addressed through the devolution of greater power within England. 95 This has been attributed in part by John Curtice to the fact that most English people feel equally English and British, meaning that there is no strong urge for a separate English legislative mechanism comparable to that which exists for the other constituent parts of the UK. See Curtice (2006: 128-138) . 96 Bogdanor (2009: 105) . Some form of the regional option, in which considerable power is wielded on a regional level, appears to be the most appropriate option. However, any attempt to address the English question is required to grapple with popular opinion, practicability, and constitutional implications. Tensions arise between these competing considerations and the most obvious prima facie solutions to the English question all appear to come with their drawbacks. An English Parliament or Regional Assemblies lack popular support, and the former threatens to produce dangerous constitutional implications, while the current localism agenda is not a substantive solution to the problem which lies at the heart of the English question.
Any proposed solution to the English question should be underpinned by some guiding principles. Two observations are particularly pertinent here. Firstly, any change should not undermine the status of the Westminster Parliament as the sovereign legislative body of the whole of the UK, and any measures which lead to the creation of a two tier system of MPs should be avoided. This risks undermining the very union itself. Secondly, the politically most popular option for addressing the English question may not necessarily be the most appropriate from a constitutional perspective. If necessary, time must be taken to make the case for a better alternative.
Although possible to resolve the English question fairly quickly to the satisfaction of much of the electorate of England, to do so in a manner that is appropriate to the very constitutional foundations of the UK is likely to prove extremely difficult. The e a e o eas fi es that come without very damaging constitutional implications. The need to address the English question is not in dispute. Charges of unfairness are sufficient in themselves to provoke a serious debate upon mechanisms for addressing this source of grievance within England.
However, it may well be that the better solutions are not necessarily the most popular. There should be no rush to resolve a problem with a similarly problematic solution, but debate should instead centre on approaches that are likely to be sustainable and effective in the long term.
